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DOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARD: LAND USE EXACfIONS 
AFTER NOLLAN v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 
by Lynda L. Butler· 
On March 23, 1994, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, a takings case involving conditions attached to approval of a building permit. No. 
93-518, 62 U.S.L. W. 3689 (U.S. Apr: 19, 1994). In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Oregon 
Supreme Court held that conditions requiring the applicants of a building permit to dedicate 
portions of their land for storm drainage · improvement and for a pedestrian/bicycle path did not 
constitute an unconstitutional taking because the conditions bore an essential nexus to the 
development of the property and therefore were reasonably related to the impact of the 
development of the property. 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993). 
The landowners in Dolan applied for a permit that would allow them to expand the use of their 
land. 854 P.2d at 438. The conditions were imposed under a city code provision allowing the 
imposition of conditions to development in order to provide for projected transportation and 
public facility needs. Id. The issues on appeal to the United States Supreme Court concerned 
the appropriate relationship that the government had to demonstrate between the conditions 
imposed on development and the state interest--that is, between the government exaction and the 
impact of development 
The Oregon court, in upholding the conditions under the takings clause, rejected the 
applicants' argument that the United States Supreme Court had, in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), abandoned the "reasonable relationship" test in favor of a 
more stringent standard of "substantial relationship" or "essential nexus."l As the state court 
explained, the Supreme Court in Nollan had noted that its nexus approach was '''consistent with 
the approach taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception of 
the California state courts.''' Dolan, 854 P.2d at 442 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839). 
Although the Court in Nollan had stated that constitutional problems would exist if a condition 
imposed in place of a development ban "utterly fail[ed] to further the end advanced as the 
OMs. Butler is a Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary, in Williamsburg, Virginia, Editor of the Fee Simple, and a member of the Board of Governors of 
the Real Property Section of the Virginia State Bar. 
IThe United States Supreme Court, in Nollan, concluded that the condition imposed by the California 
Coastal Commission on the owners of a beach front lot in exchange for permission to rebuild was not even 
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest The condition had required the lotowners to grant the 
public lateral access across their lot to enable the public to pass to and from public beach areas located 
to the north and south of the lot. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the permit 
condition failed to promote any of the public interests purportedly served by the condition of public 
access. Those interests included preserving the public's visual access to the beach, minimizing 
psychological barriers to using public beaches created by intensified coastal development, and limiting 
beach congestion resulting from development. See 483 U.S. at 828-29, 838-42. 
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justification" for the ban and had referred to this relationship as an "essential nexus," 483 U.S. 
at 837, the Oregon court did not interpret that passage as requiring a more stringent nexus test. 
Rather, as the Oregon court explained, the passage indicated that "for an exaction to be 
considered 'reasonably related' to an impact, it is essential to show a nexus between the two." 
Dolan, 8S4 P.2d at 443. A condition will be reasonably related to an impact, under the Oregon 
court's reading of Nollan, if the condition "serves the same purpose that a denial of the permit 
would serve." Id. 
Questions presented for review by the Supreme Court focused on the Oregon court's 
interpretation and application of Nollan.2 The first question concerned whether Nollan requires 
a "'substantially related' degree of judicial scrutiny of exaction and its 'essential nexus' to 
impacts of proposed development, rather than [the] 'reasonably related' degree of scrutiny used 
by [the] Oregon Supreme Court." Dolan, 62 U.S.L. W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1993). The second 
question asked whether the state court erred in holding a legally sufficient nexus existed if the 
findings made by the local government imposing the conditions demonstrate "only potential 
increase in intensity of use, rather than bona fide impact directly caused by development." Id. 
The Supreme Court's resolution of the questions presented by Dolan hopefully will clarify 
much of the uncertainty surrounding the Nollan opinion. On the one hand, Nollan appears to 
heighten the test for establishing a valid police power regulation. Although that test traditionally 
involved a substantive due process inquiry into whether the regulation was reasonably related to 
valid police power objectives,3 the Court in Nollan appears to use a different nexus test in 
evaluating the legitimacy of a regulation under the takings clause. After describing the takings 
test as requiring the regulation to '''substantially advance[ ] legitimate state interests,'" Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 2SS, 260 (1980», Justice Scalia explains 
in a footnote that this standard is indeed "different" from the due process nexus test, ide at 834 
n.3. On the other hand, other aspects of Nollan suggest that a more limited interpretation is 
2Petitioners did not present any question concerning the treatment by the Oregon Supreme Court of 
the petitioners' physical takings argument. In a footnote the state court had rejected petitioners' argument 
thai the city's dedication conditions resulted in a permanent physical occupation of a portion of their land 
and therefore amounted to a per se taking. The court explained that occupation of petitioners' land would 
occur only with their permission. Petitioners, in other words, could avoid physical occupation of their land 
by withdrawing their permit application. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Yee V. City of 
Escondido, 112 S. O. 1522 (1992), the Oregon court stressed that a physical taking can occur only when 
government "'requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land.'" Dolan, 854 P.2d 
at 441 n.8 (emphasis in original) (quoting Yee, 112 S. O . at 1528). 
'See, e.g., Village of Euclid V. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88, 395-97 (1926); Sellon V. 
City of Manitou Springs, 745 P.2d 229, 232-33 (Colo. 1987); County of Pine V. State, 280 N.W.2d 625, 
629-30 (Minn. 1979); West Bros. Brick Co. V. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 281-82, 192 S.E. 881, 
885 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937); Reesman v. State,445 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Wash. 1968). 
See generally ROGER OJNNINGHAM ET AL., 1HE LAw OF PROPERlY § 9.2 (1984) (discussing the police 
power, the due process clause, and the takings clause). 
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appropriate. As the Dolan court noted, for example, the majority in Nollan describes its nexus 
approach as consistent with the approach of most other courts, see ide at 839-40, and stresses that 
its test has, for years, applied in the takings field, see ide at 834. Additionally, the majority in 
Nollan concluded that the public access condition imposed on the lotowners could not even be 
justified under a reasonable relationship test. Id. at 838-42. Finally, the Court in Nollan was 
especially concerned about the fact that the permit condition required an "actual conveyance of 
property," which creates a "heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective." Id. at 841. The Supreme Court's 
handling of Dolan hopefully will resolve the debate about the precedential effect of Nollan. 
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